JOHN DEWEY -A Marxian Critique


SID OKUN

10 Cents

191 0512 0k7 REVOLUTIONARY WORKERS LEAGUE, U. S.

191 D51Z

260172





Libraries

Other Pamphlets

Whose War _____2c

Dialectical Materialism
An Answer to the Renegades

The Nazi Invasion of the Soviet Union

Militarism and Youth in the U.S.

Workers Answer to Boss Wor

DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM (An Answer to Sidney Hook)

Why Communism?

Workers Rights or Democracy

Where Shall the Jewish Masses Turn?

Capitalist Decay and Unemployment

Shall Workers Support a Labor Party?

American Imperialism: the Main Driving Force for War

THE FIGHTING WORKER

Central Organ of the Revolutionary Workers League of the U. S.

INTERNATIONAL NEWS

Theoretical organ of the International Contact Commission For a New Communist (4th) International)

> DEMOS PRESS 708 N. Clark Street Chicago, Illinois

Saturday, September 12, 1942

The "independence" of thought of the "great" thinkers of any epoch or period is a myth that serves only to pay dividends for the runing classes. The ideas, religions, aris and sciences of each era of history, and even of the various sub-eras, are strictly limited by the mode and relations of production. Within these confines a certain latitude of "independence" does exist, a certain amount of talent and genius may manifest itself in the works of one man in relation to another. But even revolutionary writings and revolutionary ideas must adhere to the limitations imposed by the times. For instance, a Karl Marx in the year 1650 is absolutely inconceivable. Capitalist development had not reached the stage where any man could yet perceive its further gyrations. Similarly an Adam Smith, writing and spreading his doctrine of laissez faire in the year 1942 would be an unheralded and unknown Greenwich Village rarity.

John Dewey, the "great" American professor, fits his times perfectly. John Dewey is THE philosopher of bourgeois democracy. More than that, he is the apologist for bourgeois "democracy" in its most developed form, in the most advanced capitalist nation on earth, the United States.

'With a few sly philosophical touches Professor Dewey has ennobled all the vices of capitalist exploitation. His most bitter criticisms of the system serves at the same time as its most subtle justifications. He has captured the "moods" of the present period of imperialism as no other bourgeois thinker has ever done, and he has garbed these moods with a philosophical logic so sly and so simple that it continues to suck in more gullible "marxists" (with a small "m") than any other philosopher on earth. His mechanical "instrumentalism" is THE logic of the 20th century: the mode of thinking adopted by dozens of millions who never heard either of the term or its author.

It is no accident that Professor Sidney Hook, the former Trotskyite, has spent the better part of his career trying to synchronize the writings of Dewey and Marx, trying to make an identity of the two. Dewey's philosophy is a mixture of half-truth and mental distortions that give it an aura of being "the real stuff". Dewey has plagiarized the salient points in Dialectical Materialism (not consciously or deliberately, but they are objective plagiarisms, nevertheless) and has emasculated them, has shorn them of their revolutionary content, has taken the heart out.

And this is precisely what bourgeois democracy, reformism, does to the Marxian tenets in the political field; it sifts out the heart, the revolutionary content of Marxism, and yields only on evolutionary reforms WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF CAPITALISM.

Therein lies the strength of Bourgeois Democracy and its apologist, John Dewey, both. It hides the exploitation of man by man more deftly than at any previous time in all history. We are aware of course of Mr. Dewey's championing of the cause of the "common man" and his "tirades" against exploitation. But the bourgeois state, especially un-

der Franklin D. Roosevelt, is equally fervid in its espousal of the "ill-clothed and ill-fed one fhird of the population". Demagogy, however, is the cheapest weapon of bourgeois democracy. During feudalism and chattel slavery the class system was an avowed part of the social structure; a slave and a serf could never hope to become master and nobleman. Society openly accepted class domination. But capitalism hides this fact in a maze of demagogy about "likerty, equality, fratternity", or "life liberty, and the pursuit of happiness". The state is palmed off to the multitudes as a neutral third party ABOVE classes. And under a "liberal" "democracy" (such as our present administration) the effort to maintain this fiction has become highly involved and dexterous.

Professor Dewey, too, shields himself in a maze of "scientific" "truths". He presents himself as a "neutral" third party above classes and the class struggle; as a champion in fact of the insulted and injured. But propaganda based on half truth is a thousand times more harmful than outright lies. What good is it, for instance, to tell the masses of their starvation and misery, while at the same time propounding a theory of knowledge which justifies capitalism and rules out revolutionary change as "counter to reason"?

ROOTS OF DEWEY'S PHILOSOPHY

Professor Dewey's philosophy is different from that of all other philosophies prior to the twentieth century. But its differences are exactly proportional to the differences between Democracy and the imperialist period, to the mercantile, industrial and manutactory periods of capitalism, on the one hand, and all other systems of exploitation, on the other hand.

Capitalism has brushed aside most of the superstitions and fancies of mankind. The ruthless advance of the machine and its practical workings has forever eliminated the philosophers who spun dreamvisions of the "real world" which resembled the fantasmagoria of a mother-goose book. The unprecedented advances of the material sciences in our day brings forward practical and "scientific" philosophers like John Dewey. In a period where airplanes ride at the rate of 400 miles an hour, where factories employ 89,000 people in one plant, where war budgets are 65 billion dollars in one year, and up, such idealistic claptrap as that of Bishop Berkeley, who denied that anything existed outside of his own mind, would fall on deaf ears. But Dewey's ramblings are ideally attuned to the times.

"There is a fatal ambiguity in the conception of philosophy as a purely theoretical or intellectual subject... The notion that thought, apart from action, can warrant complete certitude as to the status of supreme good, makes no contribution to the central problem of development of intelligent methods of regulation... That is the chief indictment to be brought against the classic philosophic tradition." (Quest for Certainty).

Dewey starts off with the correct premise, that theory and practice must be coordinated; that one without the other is a "fatal ambiguity".

Philosophy, says Dewey, must be a practical thing, concerned with "finding how authentic beliefs about existence as they currently exist can operate fruitfully and efficaciously in connection with the practical problems that are urgent in actual life". It must be based on science and not in "being and Knowledge 'in themselves' and at large". On the contrary it must concern itself with "the state of existence at specified times and places and the state of affection, plans and purposes under concrete circumstances".

"Ideas are worthless except as they pass into actions which rearrange and reconstruct in some way, be it little or large, the world in which we live. To magnify thought and ideas for their own sake apart from what they do is to refuse to learn the lesson of the most authentic kind of knowledge — the experimental — and it is to reject the idealism which involves responsibility".

Philosophy must be a weapon for "changing the world", not just for talking and thinking about it. It must be based on scientific fact. We live "in a moving world" in which there are no eternal truths, says Dewey. "Philosophy (must) abandon its supposed task of knowing ultimate reality and . . . devote itself to a proximate human edifice." (Quest for Certainty).

Dewey's "ideals" are the ideals of advanced capitalism. We must not permit vague "ambiguities" about "ultimate reality" to interfere with the PRACTICAL problems of our times. All knowledge, all science must be PURPOSIVISTIC. We mustn't deal with a world that is only a figment of our imagination (such as the religious world) but with the world as it really is, so that by EXPERIMENT we can change it.

But all this only states the PROBLEM of so-called philosophy, and only part of the problem at that. Within its limits it is correct. As we shall see in the following pages, however, the problem is posed one-sidedly and mechanically. "Ultimate reality", which Dewey spurns, is not so much at conflict with "concrete circumstances" as he makes out. Furthermore the exact relationships between the two can be defined by scientific law; the inner dynamics of both—WHICH IS THE REAL PROBLEM OF A SCIENTIFIC THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE—are similar. The so-called "experimental" method of proof is only ONE aspect of proof, and not really the most important either. The problem really begins where Dewey leaves off.

In discussing a scientific theory of knowledge a number of problems and discussions in the philosophical world immediately crop up.

First of all, there is the question: is there or isn't there an outside world separate and apart from our own minds? Secondly, what is the relation of our minds to that outside world?

Dewey does not deny the existence of the outside world. At least on that point he is correct.

But this is precisely where Dewey's "correctness" ends. He has grasped half of the truth, that an outside world, separate and apart from us, does exist. Now the problem is, what is the connection of the human mind to that outside world.

In his "Dialectics and Nature", Engels says: "The general nature of dialectics is to be developed as the SCIENCE OF INTERCONNEC-

TIONS, in contrast to metaphysics".

Now, what specifically are the interconnections of the human mind and nature. Invariably in all Dewey's writings — as will be made clear later — he sees only ONE side of each interconnection. He clearly sees the UNITY of opposites, but is incapable of seeing the STRUGGLE that goes on between opposites at the same time.

"Nothing but unfamiliarity stands in the way of thinking of both mind and matter as different characters of natural events, in which matter expresses their order, and mind the order of their means in their logical connection and dependencies." This quotation from "Experience and Nature will illustrate the point. A few pages later Dewey says: "That to which both mind and matter belong is the complex of events and constitutes nature".

The unity of "mind" and nature is a fact. Both are material and dynamic phenomena. The word "character" gives the impression of "mind" as an absolute, as static. Worse than that, however, these two sentences fail to specify the differences — more correctly, the opposition, between mind and nature. The outside world exists whether the human race or any individual human being is there to observe its activity or not. The human mind "knows" nature, however, only as a reflection of the actual material process itself. It is not a characteristic of that process — although, to be sure, it is a part of nature. By making mind and nature one Dewey gives the whole outside world a SUBJECTIVE character. This failure to show the relation of subjective to objective, their unity and their opposition, pervades the whole structure of Dewey's philosophy.

But this is only the first of the Deweyan half-truth.

The next problem of a scientific theory of knowledge, once we agree that there is an outside world, is the character of that outside world. Is it static or dynamic? Again Dewey sees a half truth. In his "Experience and Nature", he says, "that every existence is an event". This is another paraphrase of Heraclitus' famous "all being is becoming". There is no such thing as an absolutely stable or unchangeable phenomenon or "thing". But now, what are the characteristics - more correctly, what are the laws for this "changeableness" of nature? What is the relation, or what is the difference between one change and another change? In his same, "Experience and Nature", he states: "The rate of change of some things is so slow, or is so rythmic, that these changes have all the advantages of stability in dealing with more transitory and irregular happenings — if we know enough . . . To designate the slower and the regular rhythmic events structure, and more rapid and irregular ones process, is sound practical sense. It expresses the function of one in respect to the other".

Professor Dewey looks upon all change as something mathematical, something MECHANISTIC (no matter how often he disavows the term mechanism). There are two types of changes: slow changes and rapid ones. The slow ones give the illusion of "stability"; only the more rapid ones appear like true change. The bourgeois professor is unfortunately wrong on both counts. The very thought of "slow"

and "rapid" is something subjective. The concept of "structure" in Dewey is thus something purely subjective. A thing may be rapid to a human being and yet slow for a race-horse; or it may be rapid for a turtle and slow for a human. A so-called slow change is one in which the dialectical process takes a relatively long time in completing itself. But what is important to both "slow" and "rapid" changes is that over and above their constant quantitative development there is also eventually a qualitative conversion. The so-called structure of a human being would be his height, weight, shape, etc. These things constitute the so-called slow change of the individual, a quantitative change that can be measured accurately each day in metabolism charts, weight charts, etc., etc. But these "slow" changes suddenly at a certain stage in development give way to an absolutely revoluiionary change, i. e. when the individual dies. At this point quantitative criteria are useless in defining the change from life to death, without accompanying QUALITATIVE criteria.

Professor Dewey, living in the realism of the 20th century, cannot of course, argue away the vast revolutionary changes of the modern world; but he attempts to explain these revolutions as purely evolutionary events, purely the result of quantitative differences. By washing out the relationship between quantity and quality; in fact equating the two, Dewey has removed the spectre of revolution from the outer world. What more could capitalism possibly ask from its outstanding apologist?

ONE-SIDED MECHANISM

Dewey's philosophy constantly emphasizes the "experiment". "The only requirement fundamental in experimentalism (the name of Dewey's philosophy) whether in philosophy or science, is that any solution to be accepted as a **solution**, as a piece of scientific **knowledge**, must first pass the laboratory test." Joseph Rattner, who has compiled Dewey's rounded philosophy into an official volume, so describes knowledge.

The "laboratory test" has two important limitations. First of all it is suited far better to physical phenomena than to social phenomena. For instance, it is possible to get an inkling of an individual's intelligence by giving him an I.Q. test, or even by studying him under laboratory conditions. But this test will give no more than a mechanical clue. **Observation** of an individual in his native environment and under existing conditions will yield much more rounded and fruitful knowledge. Dewey's constant emphasis on the word "experiment" shows a far too great preoccupation with the purely mechanical MAN MADE experiments. The examples he gives are usually mechanical ones, too.

But the greatest drawback in the constant emphasis on "experiment" is that it presents only one side of the question. Dewey analyses and evaluates much of the underlying factors of what makes an "experiment" real and true. But this is a problem that science itself has clearly defined. Dewey's work here is merely a re-statement of the efforts and methods of science. But the other side of the question

— part of the problem of a scientific theory of knowledge — is **analysis** based on either observation of data in their living form or on experimentation. This analysis — Dewey is not aware of. In his "Logic, The Theory of Inquiry," he divides the actions necessary to gain knowledge into "(a) The inductive phase consists of the complex of experimental operations by which antecedently existing conditions are so modified that data are obtained which indicate and test proposed modes of solution. (b) Any suggested or indicated mode of solution must be formulated as a possibility. Such formulation constitutes a hypothesis. The if-then proposition which results must be developed in ordered relation to other propositions of like form (or in discourse), until related contents are obtained forming the special if-then proposition that directs experimental observations yielding new data . . (c) The nature of the interrelation or functional correspondence of these two phases of inquiry directly follows".

In other words, aside from the experiment WE MUST CORRELATE the data with other known data; we must study the relations between phenomena. That is the other aspect of inquiry and knowledge.

We reject, of course, the mechanical insistence on "experiment". Observation more frequently yields knowledge, particularly in social science, than experimentation. Experimentation is impossible in many fields. But outside and apart from this mechanical oversimplification of Dewey, the second aspect of inquiry is completely placed in the background by the "instrumentalist" philosopher. Although he admits abstractly that ANALYSIS must be used to explain the experiment, he never gets down to the characteristics of analysis, its relation to the outer world, its inner-laws. By inner-laws we mean the concrete problems of matter-in-motion, not only the unity, but above all the STRUGGLE OF OPPOSITES. This is a basic problem of the theory of knowledge.

By overemphasizing the "experiment" in relation first of all to "observation" and methods of obtaining data, and then, by failing to give the importance of analysis and correlation, Dewey presents a mechanical philosophy. This mechanism will be observed in all his analyses of concrete social phenomena. "There is one common character of all scientific operations which it is necessary to note," says Dewey in his "Quest for Certainty". "They are such as disclose relationships". That is absolutely correct. But the scientific theory of knowledge, after clearly presenting the position of the objective existence of the outside world separate and apart from the human mind, must disclose both the relationship of knowledge to the outer world — including all of experimentation, observation, and analysis, the relationship of these factors to each other, and must reveal the INNER DYNAMICS AND RELATIONS OF EACH, that is the question of contradictions, of mutual yet exclusive opposites. This is what Dewey does not understand.

Science through experiment and observation has disclosed many laws of many phenomena. But does analysis of these laws yield a correlation, a common series of laws to all phenomena? That is where

a scientific method of reasoning begins, a method based upon a scientific theory of knowledge. Dewey ends at this point. Marx, after putting Hegel's idealism right side up, was able to give these laws of the outer world, this DIALECTIC of Nature. The reflection of this dialectic in the human mind is the scientific theory of knowledge and method of analysis.

Modern science is through and through mechanical. With the Theory of Relativity, the concept of relativeness has been introduced — but in a mechanical fashion. Things are conceived as related to each other as one is related to two, in an orderly and mathematically predictable manner. The LAWS OF THESE RELATIONS are still not accepted by modern science; the laws of contradictions, the laws of quantity-quality change, the negation of the negation and the evolution-revolution relationship of the outer world is rejected in favor of a mechanical EXPERIMENTALIST relationship. Dewey brings the scientific method "up to date" by introducing the word "relative" into it, but he retains the mechanical approach to this subject.

Here is the way Dewey deals further with the same question (Essays in Experimental Logic):

He speaks of a fellow lost in the woods. "It is the practical facts of being lost and desiring to be found which constitute the limits and the content of 'environment'. Then comes the test of agreement of the idea and the environment. Supposing the individual stands still and attempts to compare his idea with the reality, with what reality is he to compare it? Not with the presented reality, for that reality is the reality of himself lost; not with the complete reality, for at this stage of proceedings he has only the idea to stand for the complete theory. What kind of comparison is possible or desirable then, save to treat the mental layout of the whole situation of a working hypothesis, as a plan of action, and proceed to act upon it, to use it as a director and controller of one's divagations instead of stumbling blindly around until one is exhausted or accidentally gets out? Now suppose one uses the idea — that is to say, the present facts projected into a whole in the light of absent facts — as a guide of action. Suppose by means of its specifications, one works one's way along until one comes upon. familiar ground — finds one's self. Now, one may say, my idea was right, it was in accord with facts; it agrees with reality. That is, acted upon sincerely, it has led to the desired conclusion; it has through action, worked out the stage of things which it comtemplated or intended."

This emphasis on whether a thing works or not, on practical test, on the PRINCIPLE OF PROOF, is the backbone of Dewey's theory of knowledge. A thing is true, according to Dewey, if AT LAST it meets the test of experiment. No. On the contrary, experiment merely VER-IFIES the truth of a phenomena. Truth and reality are something separate and apart from us. They exist whether we do or do not experiment upon them.

This distinction may seem trivial in the sphere of the physical sciences, but let us apply it to social phenomena. On Dewey's basis we may argue — and Dewey does — that Communism has never

been tested and has never been experienced; therefore, it is not correct, or at least not correct YET. Capitalism, on the other hand, "with all its imperfections" has worked, has been tested in the crucible of history. It is a definite improvement over the system that preceded it,—Feudalism. On the basis of Dewey's mechanical "tests" the conclusion is inescapable — we must patch up Capitalism, rather than go over to Communism.

The truth of the matter is that experimentation will verify scientific knowledge only at a certain stage of any process, at a period only of its EVOLUTIONARY development. Let us go back to the case of the lost man in the woods. So long as the woods are in a relatively stable stage, when spring follows winter without any revolutionary changes, in SUCH a period the map created by Professor Dewey's lost man is a correct map; it corresponds to his idea of getting out of the woods. But let us assume that at the edge of the woods a river has been burrowing into a hill for centuries and that just at this time it is about to break through and cover the whole wood, converting it into a lake. A revolutionary change is about to take place. Or let let us assume that underneath the woods an earthquake is in the making and is about to burst forth, while the lost man is pondering his map. Or let us assume, something much more simple, that a band of guerilla fighters stand poised on the road marked out in the lost man's map. What happens then to the "idea"? Is it true or false, correct or not? Obviously the idea of Dewey's lost man is correct only WITHIN LIMITS; it is correct only so long as the universe, and specifically this woods, travels at a peaceful EVOLUTIONARY clip.

Experimentation merely uncovers facts in a mechanical fashion. Without assembling these facts to DETERMINE THEIR **INNER LAWS** it is impossible to gain a correct dynamic picture.

The majority of the population of Peru, for instance, still utilizes old forms and old relations that prevailed under Feudalism. The land is tilled in a primitive fashion and under the absolute overlordship of the old landlord caste. The "experimentalist" philosopher looking at this panorama might easily conclude that Peru is still a Feudal state. The Dialectical Materialist, on the other hand, will examine the relationships of these feudal forms with the rest of the world. He will find that the produce of the Peru "serfs" go to market today, in contrast to remaining within the closed-in economies of Feudalism; that the deciding factor in all Peruvian production is the finance capitalists of America and other imperialist countries who have caught up the carry-over Feudalist FORMS and incorporated them intact (or almost so) into the Capitalist CONTENT of society. Without determining the inner-laws of phenomena it is impossible to understand them. The test of Peru economy can be made EXPERIMENTALLY merely by noting the Feudal forms from one area to the other. But, unfortunately, this would not yield truth — only half-truth. The basic story of Peruvian economy lies in its INTERCONNECTION with the rest of the world. Mere experimentation merely blurs that interconnection, places it in the background.

EVOLUTION VS. REVOLUTION

Dewey isn't interested in the general laws of phenomena. He accepts unquestioningly the verdict of BOURGEOIS science. Bourgeois science believes in mechanism as its method, based primarily on experimentation. Even the so-called dynamic predictions and observations of modern mathematics and science are mechanical; they conceive merely and purely of evolutionary, orderly, absolutely predictable mathematical changes; they can not and do not consider revolutionary development either in nature or society. Dewey does not even attempt to deal with the INNER LAWS common to all phenomena. He is interested only in the mechanical experiment, the superficially observable "fact" (mechanically observed facts). That is the truth for Professor Dewey.

Dewey sharply criticizes the Greek "science" because it is based not on experience and experimentation, but on "eternal and immutable laws worked out in the minds of the Greek Philosophers. From this extreme Dewey swerves to the exact opposite, that laws are not only temporary and unstable, but that what makes them laws is an experiment. In both cases, be it noted, the determining factor of knowledge is not objective reality, but the individual, the subjective.

Dialectical Materialism, on the other hand, stands in opposition to both. It is a SCIENTIFIC theory of knowledge, derived from observation, analysis, AND experimentation. The universe around us exists and will continue to exist in some form or another, whether we are here, whether we observe it or not. Nature is present not in our mind — although our minds form a very small part of this nature — but in the objective world itself. Our thoughts, ideas, perceptions, are merely reflections. But they are reflections of a REAL and a MAT-FRIAL, not an imaginary world.

The inner world has certain inner laws, certain basic characteristics. Those inner laws we call "Dialectics". The study of them, the scientific theory of knowledge, we call "Dialectical Materialism".

The science of Dialectical Materialism has uncovered certain basic characteristics of matter in motion. Future scientists in this field will undoubtedly uncover many more of these characteristics; will develop and extend this science.

What are these characteristics—as at present understood? In his "Dialectics and Nature", Frederick Engels states:

"It is . . . from the history of nature and human society that the laws of dialectics are abstracted. For they are nothing but the most general laws of these two aspects of historical development, as well as of thought itself. And indeed they can be reduced in the main to three:

"The law of the transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa;

"The law of the interpenetration of opposites;

"The law of the negation of the negation".

l—All phenomena are in constant motion. Nothing is static. All being is becoming. Everything is in constant change, and the flux is a result of the antagonism of opposing forces within the phenom-

enon. For instance, there is no such thing as WATER. There is only WATER IN A BASIN IN A HOT ROOM BEING EVAPORATED; or WATER IN A RIVER IN A COLD CLIMATE BEING FROZEN; or WATER IN A LABORATORY BEING EXPERIMENTED ON AND BROKEN INTO ITS SEPARATE COMPONENT PARTS, hydrogen and oxygen.

In each one of these processes — and there is nothing else BUT processes in nature — there is a conflict **and** a unity of opposites at the same time. The water and the heat in the hot room go through a certain intermixture and "peaceful" (evolutionary) conflict. This process will eventually reach a revolutionary conclusion; either the cool water will eliminate the fire and heat; or the heat will cause the water to evaporate. Either way, however, a point is reached after a relatively "long", "peaceful" conflict when a revolutionary change takes place — the water becomes something qualitatively different from what it was, or the fire becomes something qualitatively different.

Professor Dewey, and all the rest of the bourgeois philosophers refer to this scientific theory of the "unity of opposites" and the "evolution-revolution" process as sheer poppycock. Rattner speaks of it as "the magical antics of Hegelian idealism". Professor Burnham, a former Trotskyite, always refers to it as a childish simplification that has no meaning. We are not amazed that bourgeois thinkers are so aghast at the thought of introducing "conflict" and "revolution" into their ideology. The masses must be lulled to sleep with the modern Deweyan philosophy that all is serene, that all our troubles are little ones, minor ones, that this is the best of all possible systems. Those who reject the fantasies of religion must obviously be snared by more "logical" fantasies. Professor Dewey supplies that "logic". By emasculating the world to make it appear that knowledge is only what We make it — essentially — he tries to give men the notion that this is an INTELLIGENT world; that intelligence can iron out whatever little difficulty there is. Nature must thus be pictured as something serene, orderly, something amenable to so mechanical and orderly a thing as an experiment. But alas and alack there ARE revolutions, there are rapid qualitative changes. Worse luck for Professor Dewey. Karl Marx and Engels, following Hegel had the effrontery some 90 years ago to point this out and explain it scientifically. Worst of all, crime of crimes, they explained the dialectical process in the holy of all holies; history, economics, and politics. For the bourgeoisie, no greater crime could have been committed.

How does Dewey answer Marx's correct analysis of the world and its reflective process in the human mind? He just dismisses it all with the simple word "mysticism". It would be far better, Professor Dewey, however, if you and your clan could produce a single instance, a single phenomena, a single process in nature which is static and does not have this unity of opposites, this evolution-revolution process. Not one of them has yet, in the course of millions of words, ever "stooped" low enough to give an EXPERIMENTAL proof that Marx was wrong. Not one of them has ever given a single natural phenomenon free from this "mysticism". Professor Dewey forgets his own "exper-

imentalism" quite easily when it comes to refuting science; and he reverts just as easily to the mysticism he accuses Marx of, the mysticism implied in name calling.

2. The second characteristic of matter in motion is the quality-quantity change. Qualitative changes result in quantitative differences. Quantitative differences cause qualitative changes. If you add a few quarts of water to a single quart that was unable to put out a fire before, the new amount will achieve a different qualitative result. If you add an atom of carbon to certain carbon compounds you will have a qualitatively different compound. The difference between the quality red and the quality green is a difference in the quantity of the wave lengths, its size and length. Not all quantitative changes will cause qualitative ones; but at a certain point in all phenomena and processes such an effect will result.

This revolutionary theory, confirmed by every bit of scientific knowledge, nevertheless, is repugnant to the bourgeois thinkers. It implies too readily that if more and more and still more workers cooperated for a purpose of "freeing mankind from want" there would result a qualitative change in society — α revolution.

3. The third characteristic defines the process still more concretely. "The development of a dialectical cycle proceeds through stages of transformation through a negation of the original condition to its opposite, and in turn this new condition is transformed to its opposite, to the negation of the negation. The last condition is a 'return' in form to the first condition, but represents a condition which is entirely different in CONTENT." Every phenomenon goes through a period of birth, growth and decay, (thesis, anti-thesis and synthesis). The synthesis stage serves as the birth stage of a new process. For instance, a seed falls on the earth; that is the birth stage; it comes into conflict with the earth and struggles to root itself, that is the anti-thesis stage; the struggle goes on for some time until the conflict is resolved into a new process. If the seed is victorious a revolutionary change occurs and a full grown tree develops. If the earth becomes dominant then the seed loses its "life" and disintegrates into various gases and matters. That is a different synthesis, a different conclusion, but it is a revolutionary change, nonetheless.

On the other hand, the new tree or the new gases coming out of the decaying seed become the birth stage of new dialectical developments. The tree is in conflict with the sun and the rain. They will either cause the leaves to decay and the tree to fall, or cause a greater growth until the tree eventually dies. Or the gases from the seed will come into contact with other gases in the air, unite and form new compounds.

Dewey, of course, does not deny that there is "conflict", disturbance, and unsettlement" in the world. But he treats these as aberrations, as part of an orderly, **evolutionary** process. He refuses to define the laws — inner-laws — of these "disturbances" and "conflicts". "The history of change", says Rattner, "is 'progressive or evolutionary". Again as always, instrumentalism states only one part of the question. Yes, change is evolutionary; BUT it is ALSO revolutionary.

The two go together. The half-truth created by emphasizing only the **evolutionary** aspects of the process is a thousand times more fatal for culture, science and society that the outright lie of the doctrine of divine right, that the King gets the right to rule directly from God himself.

We stated at the outset that Deweyism is a strange admixture of half-truths, truths and gross distortions. Dewey is realist enough not to deny that conflict, antagonism, are part of the real world, but in doing so he makes two tatal errors:

First, he divorces this concept from its component part, that all conflicts are part of an evolution-REVOLUTION process; that at a certain stage of evolutionary development a revolution occurs.

Here is a quotation, for instance, from "Experience and Nature": Qualities have defects as necessary conditions of their excellencies; the instrumentalities of truth are the causes of error; change gives meaning to permanence and recurrence makes novelty possible".

This is mysticism par excellence. The idea of "permanence" is a contradiction of the human mind; it bears no relation whatsoever to reality. Change on the other hand IS a characteristic of reality. From the correct analysis of the world as a changing world some individuals draw the false conclusion of permanence as a characteristic of things. Dewey lumps the real contradiction of the material world and the false contradictions in the human mind in one pot.

"Qualities" have opposing tendencies within them; but note how Dewey defines these opposites from the SUBJECTIVE point of view: "Qualities have DEFECTS as necessary conditions of their EXCELLEN-CIES". Defects and excellencies are subjective appraisals. What may be a defect for one person is an excellency for some other one. Qualities have neither defects nor excellencies — they have only a unity of opposites going through an evolution-revolution process. Dewey poses the whole problem on its head: the contradictions of the real world are palmed off as characteristics of the mind. The words "recurrence" and "novelty" lend further weight to this charge. The question isn't whether recurrence makes novelty possible; that is purely a subjective appraisal. The idea of recurrence is a mental illusion signifying that man is not always aware of evolutionary changes. The idea of novelty is a similar illusion signifying that man does not understand the relationship of a revolutionary change to the evolutionary period before it, and, therefore, considers it a novelty (something entirely new). This mental treason, Dewey attempts to pass off as objective truth, as the real world.

"We live in a world which is an impressive and irresistable mixture of sufficiencies, tight completenesses, order, recurrences which make possible prediction and control, and singularities, ambiguittes, uncertain possibilities, processes going on to consequences as yet indeterminate".

This sentence of Dewey is classic! The world (sic) is identified as something with all the imperfections of our mind. Ambiguities are characteristics of people who do not know the answer. Recurrences are phenomena studied in a vacuum and in such a way that only one aspect is dealt with at a time. We may say, for instance, that the sun comes out every day. In that sense it recurs. But this is an oversimplification, a bit of mental (albeit useful) gymnastics. Actually, the sun is different every day. "Tight completenesses, sufficiencies," denote something that exists nowhere except in the complacencies of some peoples mind. "Singularities" are the result of incomplete analysis or knowledge of the world and its events. Similarly with "uncertain possibilities". More knowledge would at least yield for us the two possible outcomes of any process.

But Dewey lives in such a mystical world! Shear a philosopher (in contrast to a true scientist) of all his excess verbiage and you will always find a "religion" which dresses the real world in his own image. Only, in the case of Dewey, the bourgeois world has defined so many characteristics of the real world that SOME realities have penetrated even into philosopher's minds too. Unfortunately, however, much of Bishop Berkeley still remains. The confusion of objective and subjective is still with them. And the relation of evolution to revolution, which poor old Heraclitus made a start in bringing to light some 2,000 years ago, still nestles in the realm of illegal science. Humanity has long ago legalized the astronomy of Galileo and Copernicus. The struggle of physical science against reaction lasted only a few hundred years, but the struggle of social science, and particularly the scientific theory of knowledge, has been going on for thousands of years. Truth on these matters would be a death blow to the powers that be; no system could withstand the legalization of the scientific theory of knowledge, excepting socialism. No wonder that Dewey must go through all sorts of convulsions; no wonder he must borrow thousands of pieces of the correct science; in order to confound it by emasculating it of its revolutionary content and making it wholly acceptable to the reactionary bourgeoisie.

The Dewey theory of knowledge and method of investigation bears the same relationship to the scientific theory of knowledge that astrology bears to astronomy. It has many half-truths, but no correct appraisal of the whole problem. Dewey's schema is very simple:

- l—He starts with the assumption that modern science is divorced from capitalism. (We shall deal with this in detail).
- 2—He shows that science has uncovered more knowledge than any other cultural phenomenon.
 - 3—The method of science, he asserts, is one of experimentation.
- 4—Therefore, truth is only that which can be confirmed by experimentation.

He starts with the SUBJECTIVE factor — man-made science, which is the result, by the way, of capitalist development, and has — as we shall see — all of capitalism's imperfections and contradictions. And

he ends with giving truths and reality a SUBJECTIVE characteristic our own experiments. The EXPERIMENT MAKES the truth. Every conclusion that Dewey reaches is assumed in his gratuitous premise that the method of science is absolutely correct and infallible as a method — experimentation. If you accept experimentation as the ONLY truth, then you must deny that there can be any "disorder", any "revolution"; you must deny that phenomena has inner-laws that experimentation can only partly reveal or verify, but can not fully uncover.

It is, in other words, to deny that the science of what is knowledge

has any problem at all.

The stultifying effect of this "instrumentalist" theory of knowledge, when applied to history, economics, politics and even science itself, is truly astounding. Let us turn our attention to that now.

"TWO ROADS TO SECURITY"

"The rise of the scientific method and of technology based upon it is the genuine active force in producing the vast complex of changes the world is now undergoing, not the class struggle whose spirit and method are opposed to science". This quotation is from Dewey's "Liberalism and Social Action".

The same thought is expressed in "The Quest for Certainty": "Man who lives in a world of hazards is compelled to seek for security. He has sought to attain it in two ways. One of them began with an attempt to propitiate the powers which environ him and determine his destiny. It expressed itself in supplication, sacrifice, ceremonial rite and magical cult . . . The other course is to invent arts and by their means turn the powers of nature to account; man constructs $\boldsymbol{\alpha}$ fortress out of the very conditions and forces which threaten him. He builds shelters, weaves garments, makes flame his friend instead of his enemy, and grows into the complicated arts of associated living. This is the method of changing the world through action, as the other is the method of changing the self in emotion and idea." (p. 441)

Dewey correctly sees two opposites. But he fails completely to grasp their dialectical INT. R-RELATIONSHIP. Stated correctly we would say that the way that man earns his living, gains his economic necessities, DETERMINES the ideas, religions, culture, and science of the time. But Dewey separates the mode of production and the cultural superstructure. They bear no relationship one to the other. Technology, he says, has been the active force in changing the world,

Let us define correctly the relation of technology to progress. The mode of production in every period determines the relations of production and cultural superstructure. The capitalist mode of production, for instance, is COMMODITY production, based on wage labor, production for the market, to produce surplus value.

Under capitalism, the struggle for profits and the competition for markets forced through a constant revolutionization of the means of production. The class struggle between the classes (and also the struggle within the classes) for a greater share of the surplus value brought about the expansion of the productive forces: not merely technology,

but the number, adaptability and skill of workers, scientific knowledge, ect. Advances in the forces of production were both the effect of this process and the cause of its further acceleration.

Capitalism itself, moreover, came into being as the result of the growth of the productive forces and methods under feudalism, and their clash with the outmoded property and legal relations. That clash found expression in the struggle of the new capitalist class, that became the active force in reshaping society along the direction which economic changes had made possible and necessary.

Similarly, the new forces and methods of production have matured the proletariat as the active force which will break down the capitalist property and legal barriers to make way for the next major advance in the productive forces.

Dewey has recognized a key point in Marxist thought — the importance of the economic factor, the forces of production. But he has narrowed it down to a question of technology, and then abstracts even this from life and reality.

But let us assume that by "technology" Dewey means both the mode of production and its technology. He is still 100% wrong.

For instance, the ability in the 13th century to get more profits from sheep than serfs caused the expropriation of large sections of the serfdom. Under feudalism the great technological changes muddled along for centuries making only minor progress and causing greater pauperization of the masses. But the revolutionary outcome of the class struggle, the great English Revolutions of the 17th century, and particularly the classic French Revolution, liberated the forces of production (technology) to heights never before dreamed up. Through the instrumentality of the class struggle mankind gained the greatest technological progress, the greatest increase in the standard of living of all times. What Dewey calls Technology is MATED with the class struggle; it has a direct and inexorable relationship to it. Without the class struggle it would have remained at the low levels of savagery and primitive communism.

On the other hand, in the present imperialist period, technology, far from being an "active force" for social progress, is being utilized for the greatest regression in human history. Technology and science today are harnessed not to develop further the standard of living, but to lower it (both the physical and the social sciences of the bourgeoisie). Science has become the handmaiden of death; that part of science which attempts to develop life and the standard of living is a disreputable pariah in the bourgeois world. The bourgeoisie confines its scientific efforts to new cannons, new death-dealing airplanes, new poison gases, and so on. The great discoveries of obscure scientists concerning the origin of life are deprecated by the bourgeois scientific world. The dominance of the bourgeoisie is the greatest halter upon scientific development possible. (In Germany this is even more pronounced than in America, although it is sufficiently pronounced here, too). It is absolutely impossible for science and technology to

make any further progress so long as capitalism exists. In fact, science will retrogress; it will be used to "prove" that Negroes, Jews, etc., are "racial monstrosities." It will be used for more effective "plowing under". It will be utilized to throw more people out of work and reduce them to greater poverty.

Only the social revolution, (the class struggle) can liberate the forces of production; only a victory of the oppressed proletariat against the exploiting bourgesisie can yield to mankind the fruits of science.

But Professor John Dewey, who shouts so much about "realism", about "experimentation", chooses to close his eyes to this inter-relationship of science and the class struggle. To admit of the "unity of opposites" and its development in an evolution-revolution cycle, would be fatal for Bourgeois Democracy. And before all else, Professor Dewey is the apologist for Bourgeois Democracy.

From his bizarre analysis, Dewey comes to a good safe bourgeois answer: "That coercion and oppression on a large scale exist, no honest person can deny. But these things are not the product of science and technology but of the perpetuation of old institutions and patterns untouched by the scientific method." (p. 446) All you have to do, in other words, is apply "intelligence", "science" to the modern world and you will correct all of its ills. Since the class struggle plays no role in either the development or retrogressions of science the whole change can be made peacefully, merely by applying science.

This sounds very much like the non-violence ravings of Mr. Gandhi in Iindia. We are strongly tempted to turn Professor Dewey loose in the real world and try to have him convince Henry Ford (scientifically) to take back 25,000 unemployed workers, so long as the profit motive exists.

Being a mechanical philosopher, Dewey may speak incessantly of the ABSTRACT relationship between things; but not having grasped the general laws of those relationships he can not even guess at the CONCRETE living ties of these phenomena. He denies the dynamic inner-laws of nature, so can perceive only the mechanical, experimental, and non-revolutionary relationship. For Bourgeois Democracy this is an inestimable service.

This failure to understand the inner-relationship of social and natural phenomena both, pervades all of Dewey's writings. His definitions are static, dealt with in a vacuum, lifeless.

Note the relationship, for instance, of "public and private", in "The Public and its Problems":

16

"The public consists of all those who are affected by the indirect consequences of transactions to such an extent that it is deemed necessary to have those consequences systematically cared for. Officials are those who look out for and take care of the interests thus affected."

Such mechanical day-dreams we might expect from Plato. But to speak of a "public" divorced from society as it exists today, i. e. society in the process of class struggle, is to shut one's eyes to the

"There are empires due to conquest where political rule exists

only in forced levies of taxes and soldiers, and in which, though the word state may be used, the characteristic signs of a public are notable for their absence." ibid.

Professor Dewey is so interested in spinning PURE theories out of his own mind that the REAL STATE is dismissed by him as an aberration. The state as an instrument of the ruling class, to enforce "levies of taxes" and to use "soldiers" for conquest and subjection that real state, which is the only type of state that ever has or ever will exist, Professor Dewey does not recognize at all.

"There are political communities like the city-states of ancient Greece, in which the fiction of common descent is a vital factor, in which household gods and worship are replaced by community divinities, shrines and cults; states in which much of the intimacy of the vivid and prompt personal touch of the family endures, while there has been added the transforming inspiration of a varied, freer, fuller life, whose issues are so momentous that in comparison the life of the neighborhood is parochial and that of the household dull".

Like all "pragmatists", all "instrumentalists", Dewey can see no further than the SUPERFICIAL aspects that can be easily verified by simple observation or static experiment. He can see only the superficial differences between one state and another, but the basic characteristic of ALL states and the how and why of these superficial differences elude him entirely. The household gods of the Greek society referred to, are the result of a certain low level of Greek intercourse with the rest of the world. The later growth of community divinities corresponds to the greater development of economic intercourse. Dewey does not deal with the reason of these factors; he merely states them as ABSOLUTES. He is incapable of giving their dialectical rela ionships to the state. Worse than that, he fails to show that these are only parts of the SUPERSTRUCTURE of the state, just like the Greek social sports, etc. The BASIC question, the CHARACTER of the STATE as an instrument for CLASS domination, Dewey isn't even interest-

Dewey absolutely refuses to classify and categorize knowledge about social phenomena, such as states, for instance. Intrusions from non-political internal occurrences, industrial and technological, and from external events, borrowings, travel, migrations, wars, modify the consequences of preexisting associations to such an extent that new agencies and functions are necessitated." (ibid)

It is quite true that industrial changes will cause changes in the form of the state. To a lesser degree this is true also of travel and migrations. War, too, as the "continuation of politics by other means" will modify the forms of a state. But one must distinguish between what is vital and primary, and what is superficial and secondary. The mode of production determines the basic CONTENT of the state. Within those limits there can be a multitude of forms, depending on the uneven development of the economy in one state in relation to another, geographical conditions, human abilities and frailties, travel, etc. All states existent in the Western World, today, are CAPITALIST states, with the exception of the Soviet Union. But the forms differ.

depending on special economic and other conditions. America, for instance, has the highest form of "democracy", because it has the most abundant economy and can most easily grant minor concessions to the proletariat; Germany on the other hand, has a "fascist" form of state, precisely because it was defeated in a long war; its inner-economy is weaker than that of the "have-nations", it can no longer grant concessions. The differences between the German Fascist State and the Spanish Fascist State, are dictated by the levels of the economy in both nations (and to a lesser extent by other factors). If you divorce from the concept "state" that it is a class instrument depending on the given mode of production of the period, you are taking the heart out of the definition, making the definition lifeless.

Dewey must maintain this absolutely unreal fiction because otherwise the real character of capitalism might come to be understood

by the exploited.

How does a state come into being? Dewey has a ready-made

fairy tale.

"The lasting, extensive and serious consequences of associated activity brings into existence a public. In itself it is unorganized and formless. By means of officials and their special powers it becomes a state. A public articulated and operating through representative officers is the state: there is no state without a government, but also, there is none without the public."

This is a lovely picture. But where has there ever been a state organized so mechanically. ALL history has shown states arriving out of wars, revolutions, conquest, spoilation, brutality, exploitation. This Rousseauan "social contract" that Dewey revives has never been reenacted in all of history. Nowhere has a "public" ever chosen its state. States have been at all times and under all circumstances IMPOSED by a PART of the public, the ruling class. That is simple history.

Dewey continues: "The officers (of the state) are still singular beings, but they exercise new and special powers. These may be turned to their private account. Then government is corrupt and arbitrary . . . On the other hand occupancy of office may enlarge a man's views and stimulate his social interest so that he exhibits as a stateman traits foreign to his private life".

Isn't it clear why we are oppressed? When we have "bad" men at the head of the government we have a government that is "corrupt and arbitrary". If we only eliminate these "bad" men and put in "good" ones, then we have a good government. The very erudite Columbia Professor can find no other answer to corruption and oppression than the age-old myth of capitalism. For the life of him he can not see the inter-relation between the state, its government, and the MODE OF PRODUCTION UPON WHICH IT RESTS, in a word, the class struggle.

Professor Dewey, himself, is a person whose integrity can not be questioned as an individual. Yet, we recall how a similar "good" man, Professor Woodrow Wilson, equally as liberal as Dewey, took over the reigns of government and took the nation into the first World War,

to death, misery and starvation. It seems that the "goodness" of men is seriously limited by the class character of the state which they serve. This relationship — a dialectical relationship — is a thousand times more decisive for history than the "good" men (and the "bad" ones, too) of Prefessor Dewey's fairytale on the state, who live in a lifeless vacuum.

DEMOCRACY AND THE CLASS STRUGGLE

We could go on and on with such mechanistic examples in Dewey's "social" philosophy. For all of Dewey's emphasis on the existential world of experience there is not a single basic correlation of his social views with the world as it is, the empirical world, socialed. This contradiction is not as illogical as it seems. It is necessary to deal with Dewey's "ideas" on Democracy and the class struggle. Remember that Dewey insists on the "Experimental" method as the proof of correctness.

"The political and governmental phase of democracy is a means, the best means so far found, for realizing ends that lie in the wide domain of human relationships and the development of human so-

ciety". (From School and Society.)

"The development of political democracy came about through substitution of the method of mutual consultation and voluntary agreement for the method of subordination of the many to the few enforced from above".

Where is there a society where the many are not subordinated to the few? Dewey takes the THEORY that capitalism has OF ITSELF and accepts that as the PRACTICE of Bourgeois Democracy. As usual, of course, Dewey does not claim that we have "perfect" democracy. Such a "democracy" will take place only "when the machine age has . . . perfected its machinery (so that) it will be a means of life and not its despotic master." (Experience and Nature)

But the "Democracy" we have is the "best means that human

wit has devised up to a special time in history".

If Professor Dewey had studied the CONCRETE LIVING development of "Democracy", instead of the vague demagogic theories of "liberte, fraternite, egalite", he would have found that it came as the result of a vast expansion in the forces of production after the industrial revolution; that with the full bloom of the machine age, Capitalism was content to give up the sweatshop, illiteracy, and open dictatorship, in lavor of a CHEAPER method of rule, "Democracy". The "democratic" school system is the direct result of the interaction of two things: the need for proletarians who can read and write (saving millions of hours of labor time for the capitalists), and the struggle of the proletariat in the 1820's and 1830's for these privileges. The extension of the suffrage, gaining of the right to strike and other such rights were the direct result of CLASS ACTION BY THE WORKERS AND OPPRESSED. Once gained, however, these conditions convinced the capitalist class that it was eminently more wise to grant the fiction of "equality" through "Democracy", than to use the the whip, the army and the jails. And, furthermore, it was far cheaper. Introduction of the shorter day actually increased the rate and the absolute total of profits. Introduction of other reforms, as Lenin so aptly showed,

1 ps6

were the result of "parasitism", the bribing off of sections of the home proletariat on the basis of the super profits exacted from the colonial oppressed.

THAT is the real story of "Democracy"—BOURGEOIS Democracy. He who understands this DIALECTICAL DEVELOPMENT can easily explain why American "Democracy" refuses to permit Chinese "allies" to come into American ports; why Negroes are Jim-Crowed and discriminated against; why such glaring inequalities exist. Dewey, who starts with a MENTAL vision of "Democracy" ends up with considering all these inequalities and brutalities as mere aberrations, "exceptions to the rule".

Furthermore, he who understands the CLASS character of Democracy can visualize a fuller growth of human intercourse only when WORKERS Democracy, under the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, is substituted for BOURGEOIS Democracy, when the majority actually control the government in practice.

The difference between FORM and CONTENT is something Dewey never quite understands. "To profess democracy as an ultimate ideal", he says in his "Liberalism and Social Action", "and the suppression of democracy as a means to the ideal may be possible in a country that has not known even rudimentary democracy, but when professed in a country that has anything of a genuine democratic spirit in its traditions, it signifies desire for possession and retention of power by a class (SIC), whether that class be called Fascist or Proletarian".

As if modern society is not controlled by a CLASS, the BOURGEOISIE!

Dewey, incidentally, denies that there is any such thing as a Capitalist class, or for that matter of a Proletarian class. But one can't have his cake and eat it too. Either there are or there are not classes. They can't be and not be at the same time. All "Democracies" are the same to Dewey. He cannot distinguish between their form — their superficial similarities — and their content, their basic differences. For instance, the dictatorship of Napoleon was very similar in FORM to the dictatorship of Louis the Sixteenth. But what a difference in CONTENT. One represented the bourgeoisie and its revolution and the other represented the Feudal nobility and reaction. One spread progress and culture to central Europe; the other was a pillar of feudal decay and disintegration.

There is no such thing as "Democracy" in the abstract. As a living dynamic instrument it must be either WORKERS Democracy or BOURGEOIS Democracy. While the two may have similarities in form, they are absolutely antipodes in content. Humanity is today at the crossroads where it must choose between one or the other. Stated more exactly, humanity must choose between Communism and the coming Workers Democracy, or a Bourgeois Democracy which must yield within the next few years, everywhere, to Fascism.

THE CLASS STRUGGLE

The whole intent, the whole purpose of Dewey's philosophy can not be understood until we look at a few paragraphs on the question

of the Class Singgle. Here in a few brief pages the whole structure of the reactionary character of "instrumentalism" is laid bare. It is a philosophy of social regression, of support of the present system (with minor patchings), of renunciation of any basic social change. It does for American Bourgeois Democracy what Hegel, Kant and Nietsche did for the separate stages of German development—act as a prop for the system.

"In spite of the existence of class conflicts", says Dewey, in the above quoted article, "Amounting at times to civil war, any one habituated to the use of the method of science will view with considerable suspicion the transformation of actual human beings into fixed entities called classes . . . Such an idea of classes is a survival of a rigid logic that once prevailed in the sciences of nature, but that no longer has any place here."

This is certainly a very profound scientific observation. By the same logic we may say that the idea of a species called homo sapiens is a "survival of a rigid logic" that "no longer has any place here". For aren't there vast differences between the men of one continent and another, of one country and another, of one city and another, in fact, of one home and another, and even in the same family? By Dewey's logic we arrive at the conclusion that there are no races, no species of animals, and in fact, no animal kingdom at all. Everything is just a hodge-podge of individuals.

But science catalogues (and correctly so) phenomena according to SALIENT characterictics, disregarding for the moment secondary factors. There is a human race. Its salient characteristics can be seen in ALL members of that race. And there is a Capitalist Class. Its ownership and control of the means of production is a characteristic of each member of that class. This ownership and control is so vital a factor in the behavior of this class that it stamps it apart from the other major class in society, the proleteriat, which is characterized by its ownership and control of none of the means of production, by its constant sale of its labor power to the capitalist class.

Dewey's denial of classes is a convenient figleaf for denying the role of the classes in the struggle. But the figleaf is not a reflection of the real world, but merely of the dogmas and wishes of Professor Dewey and the CLASS he represents.

"The argument from past history," Dewey writes, "that radical change must be effected by means of class struggle, culminating in open war, fails to discriminate between the two forces, one active and the other resistant and deflecting". The active force is science and the "resistant" force is the class struggle, according to Dewey.

"The question is whether force or intelligence is to be the method upon which we consistently rely and to whose promotion we devote our energies."

This is childish nonsense, worthy of a two-year old. As we have pointed out before, the class struggle is not an invention of Marxists; it is the WEAPON by which mankind has introduced technological

changes. Without the class struggle, the past 5,000 years of human development would have been impossible. Mankind would have still been at the hunting and fishing stage. The exploitation of man by man is a part of the struggle of man to conquer nature. But that struggle has now reached a culminative point; exploitation of man by man—the class struggle—can be eliminated, providing only that the social and political fetters of capitalism are removed and a system of production for use is instituted. We, Communists and the proletariat, are not the ORIGINATORS of the class struggle, but the victims of it. In order to break the shackles which capitalism imposes, we must fight back against the wage slashes, wars, unemployment, starvation, brutality, etc. of the opposing class which strives to hang on to its power (like every ruling class in history) despite the fact that it is now a fetter on progress.

A ruling class can easily afford to preach "intelligence and nonviolence" to the oppressed class, since it can always make it appear that the oppressed are taking the initiative in trying to better their conditions. Professor Dewey is an ideal propagandist for Capitalism

in this task.

INTELLIGENCE

Dewey constantly uses this word "intelligence" as a counter proposition to force. We would certainly welcome an historical analysis of the word, but the great scholar is very loath to give one — except

that it is in some way connected with the scientific method.

What "intelligence" was it, for instance, which caused the great changes from Chattel Slavery to Feudalism? It was the changes in the mode of production — growth of the methods of agriculture, the three field system, and so on. But this development could never have been unleashed WITHOUT THE FORCE used by the nomadic Aryans who upset the decadence of the Roman Empire. Furthermore, the ideological weapon employed by the newborn Feudalism was the Catholic Church, with all of its unscientific dogma. But the Catholic Church, despite its illogicalities played a most progressive role in history at this one stage. In Dewey's thinking was that "intelligence"?

Or take the "intelligence" of the bourgeois revolution. The technological weapons of capitalism were present for hundreds of years under feudalism, but the tithes, church power, federalism, etc. of the feudal state made the extension of this technological "intelligence" impossible without the handmaiden of FORCE AND VIOLENCE which

destroyed the old Feudal relationships.

The student of history and politics must not project his own wishes and desires into the study. Marxian science does not **want** force and violence. But it recognizes that INTELLIGENCE (scientific progress) can be advanced AT THE PRESENT STAGE OF SOCIETY, WHEN CLASS RELATIONS STILL PERSIST—ONLY—ONLY—THROUGH THE USE OF FORCE.

It would be wonderful,— ever so wonderful — if by intelligence we could convince mankind to produce for use instead of for profit. But Mr. Dewey's very science must fight WITH ARMED FORCE in order to maintain its right to BE EXPERIMENTAL in such countries as Germany, Italy, and elsewhere. The same struggle is coming every-

where else; the continuance of capitalism after this war will mean the most certain degeneration of modern science, of Dewoy's Intelligence. Intelligence, you see, can not persist outside of the limitations imposed by the mode of production.

History is one continued story of force and violence; at one time aiding progress, at other times retarding it. The choice is not between force OR intelligence, but between force which FURTHERS intelligence (such as a social revolution), or force which DESTROYS and MISUSES intelligence, (such as the imperialist war).

HISTORICAL MATERIALISM

Two more quotations to show Dewey's complete lack of understanding of the INNER relationships of social and historical phenomena and we are through with his "instrumentalist" philosophy:

"Colossal increase in productivity, the bringing of men together in cities and large factories, the elimination of distance, the accumulation of capital, fixed and liquid — these things would have come about, at a certain stage, no matter what the established institutional system, given the new means of technological production."

In other words, the advent of capitalism and its technology would have been inevitable no matter what the government, state, or class

struggle level had been.

Amazement of amazement, however, we find that just two pages previous Dewey makes the following statement: "Insistence that the use of violent force is inevitable limits the use of available intelligence, for wherever the inevitable reigns, intelligence can not be used. Commitment to inevitability is always the fruit of dogma; intelligence does not pretend to know save as a result of experimentation, the opposite of preconceived dogma. Moreover acceptance in advance of the inevitability of violence tends to produce the use of violence in cases where peaceful methods might otherwise prevail."

There are more errors and more confusion in this paragraph than an ordinary individual can make in a year of discussion. In the first place, if it is permissible to say that capitalist productive methods were inevitable, without being accused of dogma, why is it not possuble to say that violence is inevitable? A thing is inevitable when on the basis of examination of factual data it is the only possible result. Dewey claims that capitalism would have come no matter what happened under feudalism. This is the type of "inevitability" that is sheer dogma and unscientific. Capitalism was inevitable only in the menue that the forces of production were in conflict with the relations of production and that the only possible SUCCESSFUL solution of the difficulties was the development of capitalism. But capitalism was NOT inevitable in the sense that without a capitalist class, and without the class struggle of the capitalists (in alliance with the peasantry and proletariat) against the feudal lords - without this struggle brought to a successful conclusion, there would have been no capitalism. In lact, feudalism would have retrogressed backward to lower technological levels.

In the same sense socialism is, today, inevitable. The solution of mankind's problems is impossible without a social revolution that leads to socialism. Such a revolution is absolutely INEVITABLE. It will occur whether there are Marxists alive or not, whether a Revolutionary Marxian Party gives it leadership or not. But, victory in such a revolution is not absolutely vouchsafed. It depends on the relationship of forces, and on the ability of the Marxian Party to give it leadership.

So, Dewey uses the term inevitable in relation to something that is not inevitable, and decries the use of the term to that which is

inevitable.

But the basic thing here is that Dewey does not at all understand the inner-laws of history, the relationship of means of production to relations of production, of subjective to objective. Like a typical mechanist he has abstracted the **means** of production apart from the **relations** of production; he completely divorces the subjective from the objective.

History, unfortunately for Professor Dewey and the class he represents, makes no such separation. The underlying force of all history is the means by which man, in his various periods, earns his daily bread — in other words, the economic. That does not mean that the economic is the only factor; but it is the predominant and underlying one. Cultural, physical, psychological and other factors also play a role; but the economic is the basic motif in all history. The ideas, culture, religions, customs, family relations, all flow from and are limited by the prevailing mode of production.

The relations of production, too, flow from the economic forces of the time. During the hunting and fishing stage of mankind the social relationships were Communal or Communist. No ruling class, with a monopoly of production existed, and no state acted as a coercing agency. But the low level of the mode of production under primitive Communism was too narrow to sustain life. With sheep grazing and agriculture came the social phenomenon of private property and with private property mankind embarked on the long epoch of the class struggle. The relations of production under primitive Communism became a fetter on the further development of the forces of production (technology, to use Dewey's term). Thereupon a class upheaval (a revolution) took place. Private property and a ruling class and a chattel slave class came into being, and the first of the three systems of class rule began a stormy existence that culminated only in the decline and death of the Roman Empire.

With the discovery of better grazing methods, the three field rotation system of agriculture, the "civilized" world went over to Feudalism. Again, as in the past, the relations of productions are too narrow, they act as a halter on the forces of production. The new society does not come about through an "intelligent discussion" in Dr. Dewey's study,—but through a class struggle, a social revolution. With the victory of Feudalism the forces of production were given a giant new impetus and mankind gained a far higher standard of living. But the process was repeated still once more. Capitalism replaced feudalism. And it, too, goes through a period of birth, growth, and now,

(in the period of finance capitalism, imperialism) decay.

But with the expansion of capitalism, mankind finally reaches the point, technologically, where economic security is absolutely assured. Enough food, clothing and shelter can be produced to more than adequately take care of humanity. The only obstacle today is the remaining reactionary RELATIONS of production, the dominance of a reactionary CLASS which holds back technological progress, which directs all technology into useless, destructive channels. A revolution is again necessary to change all of this. But for the first time in history it is possible to end, once and for all, the struggle BETWEEN men and go over with more vigor to the greater problem of the struggle between man and nature,

But, provided — provided that the class which can bring about these changes, organizes itself potently enough to destroy the old reactionary bourgeois system. Without the subjective factor added to history, the objective factors have no meaning. When Dr. Dewey speaks of the "inevitability" of our present high technological development he disregards the subjective element. The objective surroundings of man affect, develop, and alter his subjective attributes and behavior. But man, in turn, influences (within limits) the course of objective events too. The Russian Revolution would have come regardless of whether Lenin, Trotsky or the Bolsheviks existed. But these men and their Marxian Party were vital in making the revolution SUCCESSFUL. They could not have "created" such a revolution in 1750 or during the Middle Ages, even if they were three times as capable. But given the historical conditions these men could and did affect the further course of history. The objective and subjective are inextricably related throughout the course of all history. Dewey's separation is a bit of mental gymnastics that has no roots in the real course of history. Proof of the class struggle is in every page of the bloody march of history. But the development of technology outside and apart from the class struggle is something which by Dewey's own "experimentalist" method must be branded as false; it never happened that way, and the good Professor has as yet failed to produce it in his social laboratory.

After the first World War, Dewey praised Woodrow Wilson's ideals. Almost 20 years later Dewey sat down with pen in hand and wrote an article on these ideals — but at a time when he conceived of the "imminence of the 'next world war". Everything could have been averted, says Dewey, if only "intelligence" has been used. The opportunity was "unquestionably there". All we had to do was to establish "a system of international law that would ensure peaceful relations between nations" and regulate "the reorganization of the social and economic relations within nations". Mr. Dewey was around all these years from the first to the second war; where was the "intelligence" that he speaks about? If technological improvement is inevitable, regardless of what institutional forms exist, why isn't the domination of "intelligence" inevitable — especially since Professors Dewey and William James have been writing about it since the end of the 19th century? Mr. Dewey sees the war, but it is just a sheer

accident to him; totally unrelated to BASIC economic factors. He sees the postwar period, and mankind is still bellicose and preparing for war despite the staggering cost of the first carnage, which must be an awful reconditioner of human (abstract) intelligence — if Dewey's "intelligence" really exists. But the war has come despite these appeals to intelligence. Capitalism is again using force to keep its system alive. And Dewey supports THIS force and violence.

Dewey starts cut with the "experiment" as the cornerstone of his philosophy. But when historical "experiment" verifies the class strug-

gle, he denies even that classes exist.

He begins with the unity of theory and practice and ends with the acceptance of capitalist theory of itself as the "proof" of bene-

ficient capitalist practice.

Dr. Dewey begins with a rejection of all past philosophy. But he appropriates the mechanism of Feurbach and Locke; the social contract of Rousseau; and he mixes it with the pragmatism of William James to arrive at the present eclectic philosophy of "instrumentalism" or "experimentalism".

He starts with an abstract announcement of the relationship between things and ends with a CONCRETE separation of all the vitally

integrated social and historical phenomena.

He starts with the assertion that he is seeking the real world of experience and then deals with only the superficial aspects of that existential world. Like a lovesick boy who mistakes the lip rouge of his lady friend as her real self, Dewey lives in the surface world but skin deep only.

Capitalist theory cannot withstand its own practice. The words of "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" are easily blotted out by the reality of lim-crowism, sedition laws, and the impoverished "one-third of the nation". There is danger that this condition will deepen, will burst all bounds, will lead, in other words, to revolution. The bourgeois applopsists must eliminate this threat in the sphere of "culture", just as the police must eliminate it in life itself. Periodically the old dogmas must be taken out of the closet and repolished. Mr. Dewey is the grand expert who does this for American finance capital.

The "great man theory" is becoming a little threadbare. So the Dean of Columbia's professors invents the "technology" theory,—that all social change is due to technology; that in fact no classes exist at all. In essence this is the same old story — great inventors

make history, great men.

Professor Dewey does the same thing for the other dogmas con-

cerning the permanence of capitalism.

Based upon an unreal or half-truth world, Dewey arrives at the unrealistic and half-true panacea of "intelligence" as the modern saviour of humanity. How easy it is for the capitalist gangster to counsel intelligence and moderation to the burglarized proletarian while he holds a gun to his ribs!

To what lengths the apelogists of capitalism must go to justify its horrible crimes! Even the most honored thinker of the system must

resort to all this charlatanry to make it seem respectable